Jonathan Hawkins, the creator of the PalmPilot and Graffiti handwriting software it uses, has written a book outlining a very interesting theory of what intelligence is. “On Intelligence” takes a non-behavioral (intelligence is not the same as intelligent behavior) and non-computational (intelligence is more than the ability to compute) approach to intelligence. Instead, he views intelligence as the ability to make predictions by taking stored memories and predicting future outcomes based on those memories. Hawkins suggests, uncontroversially, that this ability comes exclusively from the neocortex and, more controversially, that all operations we call intelligent can be reduced to the ability to make and adjust predictions.
Here is my review of the book, which I gave a four out of five stars on amazon.com
Jonathan Hawkins’s concern in “On Intelligence” is to outline a theory of what intelligence is that differs from ones floated around in various artificial intelligence (AI) circles. First, most theories of how to build “intelligent machines” focus exclusively on “intelligent behavior” without focus on the “thought” that must be behind it. (Think about Alan Turing’s test of an intelligent machine: if its behavior seems intelligent to humans, it must be intelligent. Purely behavioral.) Also, Hawkins is concerned that those few AI folks who have given thought to what intelligence is, apart from behavior, see intelligence as “ability to computer” and analogize it to a computer. But, Hawkins rightly notes, what we see as human intelligence -ability to synthesize disparate information, create novel solutions, apply old knowledge to new problems – is much more than computation. (more…)
For a while now, I have been arguing against brain-based learning by writing that, no matter how much brain research we have, it will always play second fiddle to research from the fields of education and educational psychology. How the brain works is quite unimportant; how the mind works is what we are after. (Just in case the distinction is unclear, the brain is the physical equipment, replete with synapses and neurons; the mind is the experience, replete with thoughts and experiential phenomena like colors and sounds).
I just ran across a 10 year old article by neurophilosopher Jerry Fodor that interestingly helps to articulate this idea. Fodor is bemused at why so much attention is being focused on brain research, and particularly, to finding out where different thoughts are physically represented in the brain.
I’ll give you some suggestions, not all frivolous, that I’ve heard about why it’s a good thing that science is spending so much time, money and computer power on brain localisation research. I’ll also tell you why none of these suggestions moves me much. Maybe, if I have indeed got it all wrong, someone will correct me by return of post.
Fodor takes issue with those trying to prove that different thought activities – learning vocab, playing chess, learning guitar – are phenomenologically different by showing that they have different loci in the brain. Fodor’s argument against this is that we already know that they are different. Proving that they have different brain loci does little more than prove what we already knew via psychology, introspection, and experience.
All of that reminds Fodor, he says, of a “funny didactic fable of Bernard Shaw’s” where Pavlov is drilling holes into dog’s mouths to prove that “expecting food makes them salivate.” When an objector tells Pavlov that we already knew this fact, he responds that know we know it scientifically. In other words, much like brain research into where various thoughts reside in the brain, it may be interesting to do the experiments, but they only prove things we already knew. (more…)